Watch What You *Bleeping* Want: Interpretation of Statutes Dealing With Advancing Technology in Light of the Ninth Circuit Case of  Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc. by Norton, Thomas B.
Journal of Intellectual Property Law
Volume 25 | Issue 2 Article 7
October 2018
Watch What You *Bleeping* Want: Interpretation
of Statutes Dealing With Advancing Technology in
Light of the Ninth Circuit Case of "Disney
Enterprises, Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc."
Thomas B. Norton
University of Georgia School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Intellectual
Property Law by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more
information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas B. Norton, Watch What You *Bleeping* Want: Interpretation of Statutes Dealing With Advancing Technology in Light of the Ninth
Circuit Case of "Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc.", 25 J. Intell. Prop. L. 287 (2018).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol25/iss2/7
NORTON (COMPLETE) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/2/2018 1:41 PM 
 
287 
WATCH WHAT YOU *BLEEPING* WANT: 
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES DEALING WITH 
ADVANCING TECHNOLOGY IN LIGHT OF THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT CASE OF DISNEY ENTERPRISES, 
INC. V. VIDANGEL, INC. 
Thomas B. Norton* 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 289 
II.  BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................... 292 
A.   FACING THE GIANTS: A BRIEF LOOK AT SONY CORP. OF  
 AMERICA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON TECHNOLOGICAL 
ADVANCES IN THE MEDIA INDUSTRY ........................................................ 292 
B.  RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: THE FAMILY MOVIE ACT OF 2005  
 AND HOW IT SET THE STAGE FOR DISNEY ENTERPRISES ................ 293 
 1.  Legislative History of the Act. ...................................................... 293 
 2.  Judicial History. ........................................................................... 294 
C.   CATCH ME IF YOU CAN: THE VIDANGEL SAGA ......................................... 295 
 1.  The District Court Case. ............................................................. 295 
 2.  The Circuit Court Case ............................................................... 296 
D.   A BEAUTIFUL MIND: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT 
TOOLS OF INTERPRETATION .......................................................................... 298 
 1.  Textualism. ................................................................................. 298 
 2.  Intentionalism. ............................................................................. 299 
 3.  Purposivism. ................................................................................ 300 
 4.  Pragmatism. ................................................................................. 300 
 5.  Dynamic Interpretation. ............................................................... 301 
III.  ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................. 301 
A.   ANACONDA: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF  
 THE FMA IS TOO CONSTRICTING .................................................................. 302 
 
*J.D. Candidate, 2019 University of Georgia School of Law; Executive Notes Editor of the 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law; The author would like to thank both Professor Hillel Levin 
for his supervision and guidance and the editorial board for their hard work on this note. 
1
Norton: Watch What You *Bleeping* Want: Interpretation of Statutes Dealin
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2018
NORTON (COMPLETE) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/2/2018  1:41 PM 
288 J. INTELL. PROP. L. [Vol. 25:2 
 
B.   BACK TO THE FUTURE: HOW COURTS SHOULD APPROACH  
 THESE STATUTES MOVING FORWARD ....................................................... 307 
C.   DEEP IMPACT: HOW VIDANGEL’S NEW SYSTEM SHOULD FIT  
 UNDER THIS APPROACH ................................................................................... 310 




Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol25/iss2/7
NORTON (COMPLETE) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/2/2018  1:41 PM 
2018] WATCH WHAT YOU *BLEEPING* WANT 289 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As has been the recurring trend of the innovative-heavy media consumption 
age, there has been a shift in the market for media viewership to internet-based 
streaming.  There have been substantial shifts in media-viewing technology 
leading up to today’s streaming movement since the inception of at-home media 
viewership.  From the invention of the VHS, to the advancement of 4K Ultra 
High Definition televisions, to the ease of streaming popular movies and shows 
from the internet, the innovation of at-home media viewership has been one of 
the most rapid and intriguing technological transformations of the current era. 
However, the rapid advancement of technology has raised issues on how new 
types of technology comport with existing statutory regulations.  Specifically, this 
Note considers the preliminary injunction granted against a company, VidAngel, 
using new technology to offer filtered streams of popular movies and television 
shows.1  While VidAngel brought a multitude of defenses against Disney’s 
copyright claim,2 the Family Movie Act defense and the interpretation of the Act 
by the court brings an intriguing insight as to how these types of statutes should 
be considered and interpreted in view of the developing technology they directly 
implicate. 
To illustrate how rapidly the technology revolving around at-home media 
viewership has changed, consider what is arguably the most iconic service of the 
streaming media movement: Netflix. Starting up in 1997, Netflix originally began 
as a service for DVD rental and sale in 1997, eventually becoming a subscription-
based service in 1999.3  When Netflix first started its streaming service in 2007, 
its service was far from that which it has become today.4  In fact, when Netflix 
tried to use price increases to push its customers from mailed DVDs to streaming 
media, the company suffered harsh economic loss and came close to reaching 
bankruptcy.5  Fortunately for the sake of Netflix and technological advancement, 
Netflix was able to refocus on its customers’ needs and now has 117 million 
subscribers worldwide.6 
There has since been a clear shift to streaming in today’s culture.  Multiple 
companies have entered the market, and there is an increasing prevalence of 
 
 1 Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 2 See id. 
 3 Netflix Timeline: A brief history of the company that revolutionized watching of movies and TV shows, 
NETFLIX, https://media.netflix.com/en/about-netflix (last visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Tien Tzuo, The Year Netflix Almost Died, ENTREPRENEUR (Oct. 23, 2015), https:// 
www.entrepreneur.com/article/250218. 
 6 Id.; About Netflix, NETFLIX, https://media.netflix.com/en/about-netflix (last visited Mar. 
19, 2018). 
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“stream exclusive” shows created by streaming service providers.7  Even 
televisions themselves have integrated internet services to allow for more 
accessible streaming.8  More radically, some consumers (a large percentage of 
them millennials) have begun to completely eliminate cable subscriptions and 
instead rely solely on internet streaming services for all manners of media 
entertainment.9 
In the midst of today’s cultural obsession with streaming, VidAngel saw its 
chance to make an impact and have a hand in the stream-heavy culture.  
VidAngel was founded on the premise that those who have objectional views to 
explicit content in movies and television should have the ability to watch and 
stream popular media and not feel as if they were excluded from the rest of the 
American population and culture.10  Prior to its current model, VidAngel 
attempted to enable filtered streaming through Google-based services but was 
halted in its tracks by complications with Google and major film entertainment 
studios.11  Faced with this dilemma, VidAngel then developed its own unique 
model to allow for filtered streaming.12  This model involved VidAngel 
purchasing multiple DVD and Blu-ray disc copies of different titles, after which 
VidAngel took the discs and processed the movie file (commonly referred to as 
“ripping” the file) to break it up into small segments in order to tag each segment 
for some type of filterable content.13  Each individual disc purchased by 
VidAngel was given a unique barcode to keep track of how many customers 
purchased the film to stream.14  Since VidAngel only kept a set amount of 
physical discs of each movie, only an equal set amount of customers could 
 
 7 See Robert Channick, Ditching cable in 2017? What you need to know about streaming TV, CHI. 
TRIB. (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-cable-cord-cutting-1216-
biz-20161215-story.html. 
 8 See, e.g., Ryan Waniata & Brendan Hesse, Cord-cutting 101: How to quit cable for online streaming 
video, DIGITAL TRENDS (Feb. 13, 2018, 9:59 AM), https://www.ditigaltrends.com/home-
theater/how-to-quit-cable-for-online-streaming-video/. 
 9 Channick, supra note 7.  One significant point brought up by Channick is the 1.3 million 
drop in traditional television subscribers in September 2016 and the projected drop from 99.5 
million in December 2016 to 93.9 million in 2020.  A big factor in this dropping subscription 
rate is the fact that traditional television providers, like DirecTV and Dish, are providing their 
own streaming services in addition to traditional cable and satellite television. 
 10 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 10, Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 
(9th Cir. 2017) (Docket No. 16-56843). 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 11–12.  VidAngel accounts for over eighty different types of filterable content, and 
a user who chooses to filter out the end credits must also select a second filter that pertains to 
the actual content of the movie.  However, it should be noted that some of the filters may not 
directly apply to all movies, which brings up an issue as to what is actually being filtered in 
certain cases. 
 14 Id. at 12. 
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purchase the film for streaming at one time.15  After a customer watched their 
streamed movie or show, they were encouraged (but not required) to “sell” back 
the title so that they are refunded all but $1 for each night they kept their 
purchase.16 
At the outset of launching this business model, VidAngel notified Disney and 
other major studios of its intentions and its method for streaming.17  VidAngel 
also encouraged any studios which felt that their method of filtered streaming 
was contrary to copyright laws to contact VidAngel concerning potential issues.18  
Consequently, the major studios filed a suit eleven months after this notice for 
violations of the Copyright Act in the Central District Court of California, where 
the court granted a preliminary injunction against VidAngel.19  This decision was 
upheld by the Ninth Circuit on August 24, 2017.20 
After the preliminary injunction was granted, VidAngel launched a new 
business model for its streaming service.  VidAngel, at the time of this Note, 
currently offers a subscription-based service where subscribers can connect their 
VidAngel account to any of their other streaming accounts, such as Netflix or 
Amazon Prime.21  VidAngel no longer uses decryption of discs as a method to 
filter but instead uses a “crowd sourced tagging tool” and “some machine 
learning algorithms for filtering,” which allow subscribers to watch filtered media 
from whatever primary streaming service they subscribe to.22  This Note will 
analyze the Ninth Circuit interpretation of the Family Movie Act of 2005 (FMA) 
and how statutes should be interpreted in the face of advancing technology, using 
VidAngel’s current business model’s compatibility with the FMA as an 
illustration.23 
Part II of this Note begins with a brief review of a Supreme Court ruling that 
set the stage for this Note’s analysis.  It then shifts into the background of the 
FMA, including relevant legislative history and the single piece of judicial history 
that concerns the relevant subsection of the FMA.  Part II continues with a 
discussion of the Ninth Circuit ruling in Disney Enterprises, specifically concerning 
its interpretation of the FMA.  Then, Part II finishes with the different tools of 
 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 12–13. 
 17 Id. at 13. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957, 963–64 (C.D. Cal. 2016), 
aff’d, 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 20 Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 21 How VidAngel’s New Service Works, VIDANGEL, https://vidangel.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/ 
articles/115010522747-How-VidAngel-s-New-Service-Works (last visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
 22 Facts Concerning VidAngel’s New Filtering Technology, VIDANGEL, http://blog.vidangel.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Fact-Sheet-VidAngels-New-Technology.pdf (last visited Mar. 
19, 2018). 
 23 17 U.S.C.A. § 110(11) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61). 
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interpretation relevant to this Note’s analysis.  Finally, Part III consists of an 
analysis of the approach the Ninth Circuit takes and a suggestion that statutes 
similar to the FMA, which directly impact rapidly changing technology, should 
be interpreted to accommodate such technological growth. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  FACING THE GIANTS: A BRIEF LOOK AT SONY CORP. OF AMERICA AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS ON TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN THE MEDIA INDUSTRY 
Rapid media-based innovation that has occurred over the past few decades 
has brought its own difficulties that have caused legal troubles through the years, 
especially in the world of copyright.  These issues can be traced back to an 
important 1976 case where Universal Studios sought to hold Sony responsible 
for the illegitimate use, which resulted in copyright infringement, of its Betamax 
videocassette recorder.24 
In 1984, a Supreme Court majority set the foundation for the home video 
business, incidentally aiding Universal in the long run.25  In Sony Corp. of America 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Supreme Court held that Sony did not commit 
contributory infringement by “supplying the ‘means’ ” for copyright 
infringement since there was an unobjectionably legitimate widespread use of the 
Betamax.26  Additionally, the Court declined to expand copyright protections 
beyond what is statutorily guaranteed, leaving to Congress the task of managing 
technological advancements.27  This early decision lends support to the 
suggestion that certain statutes should be interpreted in ways which allow for 
technological innovation, not stifle it. Similar to the Sony case, the litigation 
concerning VidAngel calls for an innovation-friendly reading of a statute that 
would otherwise hamper technological innovation. 
 
 24 Ashlee Kieler, On This Day In 1984, The Supreme Court Saved The VCR From Certain Death, 
CONSUMERIST (Jan. 17, 2014, 3:05 PM), https://consumerist.com/2014/01/17/on-this-day-
in-1984-the-supreme-court-saved-the-vcr-from-certain-death/. 
 25 What the 1984 Betamax ruling did for us all, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2014, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-betamax-ruling-anniversary-20140117-
story.html#axzz2qgCGPouK. 
 26 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 436, 456 (1984), superseded 
by statute, Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2863. 
 27 Id. at 431. 
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B.  RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: THE FAMILY MOVIE ACT OF 2005 AND HOW IT SET 
THE STAGE FOR DISNEY ENTERPRISES 
1.  Legislative History of the Act.  The current FMA was first introduced to the 
Senate on January 1, 2005, by Senator Orrin G. Hatch under Title II of the 
Family Entertainment and Copyright Act.28  The FMA was brought up with the 
explicit purpose to tackle the issue of companies that used filtering technology 
for family-friendly viewing of movies.29  One of the initial concerns debated on 
the first introduction was that litigation surrounding technology which enabled 
filtering was going to cause a “hampering [of] the development of the technology 
that families may find helpful in protecting children from potentially 
objectionable content.”30  The main concern of the FMA revolved around its 
potential application to “ad-skipping,” but Senator Cornyn assured the Senate 
that the FMA was only applicable to “using a certain kind of technology to 
modify the viewing experience of a movie to skip over objectionable content.”31  
Although it was not a significant issue in 2004 or 2005, it should be noted that 
when the legislation was proposed there was no definition of what constituted 
an “authorized use” or authorized copy of a motion picture outside of the fact 
that any alteration must take place in a private household and at the discretion 
of the private viewer, but “unauthorized use” was compared to that of a 
“bootleg” copy of a movie.32 
After being referred to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Property, the proposed FMA legislation was brought 
before the House of Representatives on April 12, 2005, through a report by the 
Committee on the Judiciary.33  While the majority of the House viewed the 
proposed FMA legislation favorably, there was a minority view that directly 
opposed the FMA.34  The primary concern of the minority view was that the 
FMA would interfere with pending litigation and that it unfairly favored one side 
of the case.35 The minority view also charged the FMA as being unnecessary 
since those who wish to not view certain types of content and/or protect their 
children from such content simply have the option of not exposing themselves 
 
 28 151 CONG. REC. S494-95 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 29 Id. at S495. 
 30 Id. at S499. 
 31 Id. 
 32 150 CONG. REC. S11,852–53 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch).  
“Bootleg” refers to some manner of illegally copying a performance (either by recording or 
other means) and then redistributing the illegal copy.  See, e.g., Michael Coblenz, Intellectual 
Property Crimes, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 235 (1999). 
 33 H.R. REP. NO. 109-33, at 5 (2005). 
 34 Id. at 69. 
 35 Id. at 69–72 (citing Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. Civ.A02CV01662RPMMJW, 2005 WL 
1993421, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 17, 2005). 
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and/or their children to these types of movies.36  The minority view additionally 
noted its concerns over the inconsistency of filtering and the impairment of 
“artistic freedom and integrity.”37 
On April 19, 2005, a debate over the bill occurred in the House with the 
primary disagreement concerning whether the FMA was an acceptable provision 
of the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act.38  However, advocates for the 
FMA’s inclusion referred to it as applying to “available technology,”39 and 
“allow[ing] for technology innovation to flourish without having to face legal 
challenges.”40  Despite the opposition, the FMA passed with the rest of the 
proposed legislation through the House and was approved by President George 
W. Bush on April 27, 2005.41 
2.  Judicial History.  Section 110(11) of the FMA has been the subject of 
virtually no prior litigation leading up to the current Disney Enterprises case.  In 
fact, the only case prior to Disney Enterprises was the very case the minority view 
from the House of Representatives hearing on April 12, 2005, was concerned 
about influencing.42  As the minority view predicted, passing the FMA led to the 
dropping of ClearPlay from the initial action, but it left Clean Flicks out to dry 
and become primarily liable for the copyright lawsuit.43 
Clean Flicks engaged in a filtering model that involved purchasing a movie, 
creating a digital copy of the movie on a computer, editing the digital copy, and 
then copying (“burning”) this edited copy onto multiple blank DVDs to sell on 
the market.44  Instead of fast-forwarding through objectionable content, Clean 
Flicks in redacted audio, replaced audio with ambient noise, cropped video, or 
put a black bar over visual content.45  This filter-and-burn method seems to have 
been directly targeted as a type of infringement by the FMA considering the 
explicit prohibition against any “fixed cop[ies] of the altered version” as well as 
any form of audio or visual content “in place of existing content in a motion 
 
 36 Id. at 72–73.  Those who wish to avoid objectionable content, according to the minority 
view, should use the rating system implemented in the movie industry to avoid any type of 
content they may find objectionable. 
 37 Id. at 73–76. 
 38 151 CONG. REC. H2117-20 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 2005). 
 39 Id. at H2117 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). 
 40 Id. at H2119 (statement of Rep. Cannon). 
 41 151 CONG. REC. H5598 (daily ed. June 30, 2005). 
 42 H.R. REP. NO. 109-33, at 5 (2005) (citing Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. 
Civ.A02cv01662RPMMJW, 2005 WL 1993421 (D. Colo. Aug. 17, 2005)). 
 43 Huntsman 2005 WL 1993421, at *2; Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. 
Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006). 
 44 Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1238. 
 45 Id. 
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picture.”46 Unsurprisingly, the court in Clean Flicks found that Clean Flicks had 
violated copyright laws, and Clean Flicks was barred from continuing its 
business.47 
Considering the Huntsman case, it is equally clear that the FMA was passed at 
least to allow ClearPlay to avoid being tied up in litigation.48  At the time of 
litigation, ClearPlay’s model involved downloading software onto a user’s 
computer to play the original DVD.49  The software was specific to each movie 
and allowed for filtering through edits and muting of the original DVD.50  This 
method of business was directly in line with the language of the FMA since it 
was from an “authorized copy” and involved “technology that enables such 
making imperceptible [of the film] . . . at the direction of a member of a private 
household” without making any type of “fixed copy of the altered version.”51 
C.  CATCH ME IF YOU CAN: THE VIDANGEL SAGA 
1.  The District Court Case.  After filing suit against VidAngel, Disney was 
granted a preliminary injunction by the Central District Court of California.52  As 
previously stated, the claims and defense asserted by both sides go far beyond 
just the FMA.53  However, the FMA defense and analysis will be the primary 
focus of this Note.  In evaluating the copyright infringement claim against 
VidAngel, the court took issue with whether VidAngel was streaming from an 
authorized copy.54  In rejecting VidAngel’s FMA defense, the court reasoned that 
the language of the statute was unambiguous and that VidAngel clearly did not 
comply with the FMA, eliminating any chance of asserting it as a defense to 
copyright infringement.55 
In addition to primarily relying on the statutory text, the court pointed to 
legislative history which indicated that the FMA was not meant to provide 
exemption from anti-circumvention provisions, even to engage in conduct 
permissible under the FMA.56  Applying this decision to the FMA defense against 
copyright infringement, the court found it clear that VidAngel did not operate 
 
 46 17 U.S.C.A. § 110 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
 47 Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1243–44. 
 48 H.R. REP. NO. 109-33, at 69–72 (2005) (minority view). 
 49 Defendants’ Answer and Counterclaims at Huntsman v. Soderbergh, ¶¶ 61–66, No. 
Civ.A02CV01662RPMMJW, 2005 WL 1993421. 
 50 Id. 
 51 17 U.S.C.A. § 110 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
 52 Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 971–72. 
 55 Id. at 972. 
 56 Id. at 968 (citing 150 CONG. REC. S11852-01, S11853 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2004) (statement 
of Sen. Hatch)). 
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from an authorized copy and therefore was prohibited from the FMA defense.57 
Unfortunately, the court did not engage in a detailed interpretation of the statute 
because it believed VidAngel was in direct violation of the plain text.58 
2.  The Circuit Court Case.  The Ninth Circuit engaged in a considerably more 
detailed analysis of the FMA.  Like the district court, the Ninth Circuit  analyzed 
the “authorized use” language of the FMA.59  However, the Ninth Circuit also 
spent significant time discussing what it means to be “from” an authorized 
copy.60  The court opted for a plain reading, under which  the actual transmission 
must come directly “from” an authorized copy, rather than simply originate from 
one, as in  VidAngel’s model. 61 
The Ninth Circuit then considered the titles under which the FMA currently 
resides.62  The court found that the headings of the Family Entertainment and 
Copyright Act of 2005 and 17 U.S.C. § 110 indicate that the FMA is only a 
safeguard for actual filtered performances, and not the process to make a 
performance possible.63  To backup this context-based interpretation, the court 
compared the heading of § 110 to another section of Title 17 which prompted 
the statute as being protective of the actual reproduction.64  Additionally, the 
court found VidAngel’s business model to be in direct contrast with the purpose 
of the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act’s purpose of “provid[ing] for 
the protection of intellectual property rights.”65  Further, the court also stated 
that VidAngel was in direct contrast with the FMA since it would have an effect 
on the existing copyright scheme.66 
VidAngel’s assertion that it was authorized under the statute to use 
technology to enable making parts of a film imperceptible was also shot down 
on a textual basis.67  The court reasoned that the “such making imperceptible” 
language, which VidAngel argued gave a broad meaning to the FMA so as to 
 
 57 Id. at 972. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 857 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 60 Id. at 858. 
 61 Id. (citing Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1085 (2015); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN 
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 148–49 (2012)). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. (citing Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, § 202(a), 
119 Stat. 218; 17 U.S.C.A. § 110 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61)). 
 64 Id. (comparing 17 U.S.C.A. § 110 and 17 U.S.C.A. § 108 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. 
No. 115-61)). 
 65 Id. at 858–59 (quoting Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-9, 119 Stat. 218). 
 66 Id. (quoting § 110 (“Nothing in paragraph (11) shall be construed to have . . . any effect 
on . . . limitations on rights granted under any other section of this title or any other paragraph 
of this section.”)). 
 67 Id. at 859 (citing § 110(11)). 
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include any technology which makes certain movie content imperceptible, was a 
clear reference to the earlier text of § 110(11), which states the making 
imperceptible must come from an authorized copy.68  Using its previous analysis 
of what constitutes being from an authorized copy, the court ruled that 
VidAngel’s service was still not covered by the FMA since it was not operating 
from an authorized copy when making content imperceptible.69 
After directly addressing each of VidAngel’s individual interpretations of 
sections of the FMA, the court noted that there could be a significant loophole 
if it were to accept VidAngel’s interpretations.70  Specifically, the court was 
concerned that if it lent credence to VidAngel’s interpretation, it would open the 
door to legitimizing various types of piracy since they all likely start “from” an 
authorized copy.71  The court’s chief concern was the erosion of digital 
performances’  commercial value if unlicensed streamers put up movies while 
only filtering out something as minor as the credits to the film.72 
While the majority of the court’s interpretation of the FMA was principally 
textualist, the court also supported its conclusions using legislative history.73  
Specifically, the court relied upon statements from the sponsor of the FMA, 
Senator Orrin Hatch.  First, the court pointed to language from the records 
stating that the FMA should be construed narrowly in order to prevent any 
impact on the established doctrines of copyright.74  Further, the court noted 
Senator Hatch’s statements that infringing performances or transmissions are 
not rendered non-infringing only because they make certain parts of films 
imperceptible and that any assertion of violation of copyrights or copy protection 
in order to further the exercise of viewer choice does not run parallel to the 
legislative intent or the technological necessity of the FMA.75 
The second use of the legislative history was to illuminate the fact that there 
was an accepted and legal business for filtering movies.76  The court made note 
of the fact that both the Senate and House of Representatives identified the 
ClearPlay model as what was intended to be protected under the FMA.77  The 
 
 68 Id. (quoting § 110(11)). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. (citing 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHTS § 14:2 (2017)). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. (quoting 151 CONG. REC. S450-01, S501 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2005) (statement by Sen. 
Hatch)). 
 75 Id. at 859–60 (quoting 151 CONG. REC. S450-01, S501 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2005) (statement 
by Sen. Hatch)). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 860 (citing 151 CONG. REC. S450-01, S501 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2005) (statement by 
Sen. Hatch); H.R. REP. NO. 109-33, pt. 1, at 70 (2005) (minority views); Derivative Rights, Moral 
Rights, and Movie Filtering Technology: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual 
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court concluded by pointing to the fact that ClearPlay had been judicially 
determined to be in compliance with the FMA, while a company that made digital 
copies from lawfully purchased discs to filter, similar to VidAngel, was in 
violation of copyright law and not in compliance with the FMA.78 
D.  A BEAUTIFUL MIND: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT TOOLS OF 
INTERPRETATION 
When faced with interpreting a statute, the legal field provides a substantial 
number of different avenues to structure arguments.  The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that different interpretive canons are useful when a statute 
presents ambiguity.79 
While different members of the legal profession certainly have preferences 
for particular interpretative tools, it is necessary for any individual trying to argue 
for a certain interpretation to be able to maneuver through the various 
interpretative tools.  Likewise, the analysis in Part III of this Note requires the 
use of multiple tools to demonstrate why a more expansive interpretation of 
technology-based statutes is essential. 
1.  Textualism.  While not all members of the legal field rely as heavily on 
textualism as the late Justice Scalia, there is a general acceptance that the text of 
a statute controls if it is not ambiguous.80  Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that interpretation should start with the language of the statute and 
end there if the language is not ambiguous.81 The problem, however, is that 
“easy” cases don’t come up in court; instead, courts are more often than not 
faced with statutes containing some manner of ambiguity or question as to their 
text.82 
As the name plainly suggests, textualism is centered around using the text of 
the statute to decipher any ambiguity or confusion in the statute.83  Textualists 
 
Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Matt Jarman, ClearPlay 
CEO)). 
 78 Id. (citing Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. Civ.A02CV01662RPMMJW, 2005 WL 1993421, 
at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 17, 2005); Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 
1236, 1238, 1240 (D. Colo. 2006)). 
 79 See, e.g., Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 325 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Canons 
of interpretation ‘are quite often useful’ . . . when statutory language is ambiguous.” (citing 
United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 611 (1989))). 
 80 See, e.g., BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004); Blue Chip Stamps 
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 81 Id.; 421 U.S. at 756 (Powell, J., concurring) (“The starting point in every case involving 
construction of a statute is the language itself.”). 
 82 Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 61 (1994). 
 83 See generally Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005). 
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utilize a variety of textual “tools” in order to arrive at conclusions.84  It is not 
necessary to delve into the nuances of these numerous tools, only that they center 
around the text of the statute.85  These tools can include the definitions of words, 
surrounding words and phrases in the statute, and even the text of other statutes 
that make up an act.86  Using these tools, textualists aim to interpret the statute 
in such a way as to give people subject to the statute reasonable notice as to what 
the statute means based primarily on the actual text of the statute.87 
2.  Intentionalism.  Like textualism, intentionalism also gives power to the 
legislature’s words in interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions. 
Intentionalists, however, look instead to relevant legislative history of a statute 
in order to resolve ambiguity.88  Through the legislative history, intentionalists 
aim to determine the intent of the legislature which enacted the statute.89 
While intentionalism and textualism both aim to give the legislature power in 
resolving ambiguity, intentionalism is typically considered to be the subjective 
counterpart to textualism’s objective approach to looking at the text.90  In 
evaluating an ambiguous statute, intentionalists give more weight to different 
types of history.91  While there is a general hierarchy of legislative history, there 
is some divide as to whether this hierarchy is definitive or if there should be 
consideration as to the underlying factors that give the hierarchy its structure.92  
Despite this discrepancy, there is a general consensus among intentionalists that 
committee reports are some of the more important pieces of legislative history,93 
which will be of consideration in this Note’s analysis. 
Indeed, it can be difficult to pinpoint a single, definitive legislative intent.  
This leads to some intentionalists settling for a “conventional intent” as 
determined by the legislature generally agreeing or acquiescing to reports or floor 
statements by sponsors.94  However, this approach is criticized as being contrary 
to proper legislative process and based upon flawed assumptions.95  Another 
possible method for intentionalism is to allow judges to use “imaginative 
 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 352. 
 88 Id. at 349. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 348. 
 91 Id. at 359–60. 
 92 See HILLEL Y. LEVIN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: A PRACTICAL LAWYERING COURSE 
409–10 (2d ed. 2016). 
 93 Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified Intentionalist 
Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1988–1989). 
 94 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 
42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 327 (1990). 
 95 Id. 
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reconstruction” and reconstruct how the legislature would answer the 
interpretive question at hand.96  It should be clear why this is problematic: it 
potentially allows a judge to mask personal discretion as the reconstructed intent 
of the legislature. 
3.  Purposivism. As its name suggests, purposivism considers the purpose of 
the statute itself and assumes that the legislature is reasonable and will reach a 
reasonable, purposive result in crafting and passing a statute.97 Importantly, in 
some situations purposivism can serve as a direct counterargument to 
intentionalism and textualism, in that the latter two interpretive methods may be 
directly at odds with and even violate the actual purpose of the statute.98 
However, purposivism is clearly more subjective than both intentionalism 
and textualism, which opens it up to sharp criticism.  One pitfall of purposivism 
is the assumption that the legislature always acts reasonably, which is not the 
case.  Reasonable people do not always come to reasonable conclusions, and 
some legislation is even passed with the intent of not being reasonable in order 
to further some other objective.99  It is also a stretch to say that a statute serves 
a singular purpose since members of the house and senate may pass legislation 
with the goal of pleasing a variety of interest groups, which may be contrary to a 
common public purpose of a statute.100 
Additionally, purposivism must typically follow the text or the history of a 
statute in order to derive the purpose, making it difficult to combat a textualist 
or intentionalist interpretation.  Nevertheless, purposivism has its place as a 
foundation of statutory interpretation and can be a decisive tool in certain 
cases.101 
4.  Pragmatism.  Pragmatists have a much different approach than those that 
subscribe to any of the aforementioned theories.  In simple terms, pragmatism’s 
singular goal is to use practical reasoning in order to come to conclusions that 
are most beneficial to society.102  Unlike textualism, intentionalism, and 
purposivism, pragmatism does not have a clear method for interpreting statutes.  
 
 96 Id. at 329 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286 
(1985)). 
 97 Id. at 334. Note that purposivism focuses on the general purpose of the statute in resolving 
a problem and how to best give effect to that purpose, and intentionalism focuses on 
determining the specific intent of the legislature on an issue that falls (or doesn’t fall) under a 
statute’s authority. 
 98 Id. at 333 (citing United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979)). 
 99 Id. at 335. 
 100 Id. (citing Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227–33 (1986)). 
 101 Id. at 324–25. 
 102 LEVIN, supra note 92, at 143–44. 
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Pragmatists instead focus on each case individually in order to evaluate what is 
best for society in each situation.103 
While pragmatism is appealing in theory, it is rarely specifically invoked, and 
is often not sufficient without reinforcement of another interpretive tool.  
Although pragmatists assert varying reasons why judges are able to and should 
interpret statutes this way, there is a certain amount of uneasiness with allowing 
judges considerable range in interpreting statutes.  However, using other 
interpretive tools and theories to backup an interpretation can result in a 
successful argument for a pragmatic outcome while still appealing to those who 
subscribe to the more traditional theories of interpretation. 
5.  Dynamic Interpretation.  Similar to pragmatism, dynamic interpretation 
involves a less traditional approach to statutory interpretation.  Dynamic 
interpretation calls for statutes to be interpreted more like the common law and 
the Constitution in order to adapt to society’s progression and development.104  
This is generally when the statute has become “old” or “antiquated” and the legal 
or societal landscape has significantly shifted.105 
Similar to pragmatism, this approach grants judges a lot of discretion, which 
creates the concern that judges can further their own personal agendas or beliefs 
under the mask of being “dynamic.”  Putting the concern of false dynamic 
interpretation aside, true dynamic interpretation is probably more prominent than 
judges admit.  It is arguable that judges dynamically interpret statutes much like 
pragmatists, but they do so under the guise of other forms of statutory 
interpretation. This allows for judges to use true dynamic interpretation without 
being faced with the criticism of furthering their own personal beliefs.  In 
contrast to pragmatism, however, a dynamic approach is more likely to show 
why the various interpretive tools fail in application to an old statute that is 
inconsistent with the present legal and societal landscape. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Now that a general overview of the relevant background information has 
been provided, this Note will proceed with an analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the FMA, how this court and other courts should instead 
interpret these statues, and conclude by analyzing how VidAngel’s new filtered 
streaming process should fit in with the FMA. 
 
 103 Id. 
 104 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1481 
(1987). 
 105 Id. 
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A.  ANACONDA: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE FMA IS TOO 
CONSTRICTING 
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation starts with the text, as it should, since it 
had not previously interpreted the FMA.106  While this is the obvious starting 
point and all interpretations should first consider the text, the Ninth Circuit does 
little beyond textual analysis.  It does incorporate some legislative history, but 
only to the extent to reaffirm what the court believed to be unambiguous text.107 
The first part of the text that the court directly considers is what qualifies as 
being “from an authorized copy.”108  In ordinary circumstances, the word 
“from” would not cause as much ambiguity as it does in this situation.  While 
the court takes what is the most common use of the word “from” and applies it 
to the FMA, the court inadvertently constricts future technology.  Under the 
court’s interpretation, the permitted filtering of a movie must come directly from 
an authorized copy of a movie.109  In the context of VidAngel’s situation, this 
means that there must be a hard copy distributed similar to the ClearPlay 
model.110 
Now, consider the prevalence of streaming and the fact that hard copies of 
movies and shows are quickly decreasing in popularity.111  Because of the shift 
in technology used to view media, the word “from” is actually more ambiguous 
than the court gives it credit for.  Streamed media does not come “from” a hard 
copy; instead, it comes from a digital copy stored on a server and distributed to 
subscribers.  Thus, while it appears at first glance that the court made a 
reasonable interpretation of “from,” it fails to acknowledge the ambiguity that 
surrounds this word in the context of modern technology. 
However, that there is ambiguity in the word “from” does not mean 
VidAngel wins.  Instead, there should have been further analysis and 
consideration of what it means for something to be “from” an authorized copy.  
This very well could come out in favor of VidAngel, but there is still the issue of 
what would constitute an “authorized copy” and if the stream is actually from an 
authorized copy.  Given VidAngel’s original business structure of creating a 
 
 106 Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 857 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 
Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2016)). 
 107 Id. at 859 (stating that “although we need not rely upon legislative history, it supports our 
conclusion”). 
 108 Id. at 857. 
 109 Id. at 857–58. 
 110 Id. at 859–60. 
 111 Ryan Faughnder, Home Video Sales Shrank Again in 2016 as Americans Switched to Streaming, 
LA TIMES (Jan. 6, 2017, 12:05 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/holywood/la-fi-ct-
home-video-decline-20170106-story.html. 
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master copy by ripping movies from a disc,112 there could very well be an issue 
that the stream is actually coming from the unauthorized master copy rather than 
an authorized copy.  Considering the court’s evaluation of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) claim, VidAngel could still fall short of satisfying the 
FMA.113 
However, VidAngel also brought up the fact that there is an exception in the 
FMA for the technology that is used for making media imperceptible.114  The 
court correctly construes this language of the FMA to refer back to the earlier 
language requiring exemptions to come from an authorized copy.115  Since the 
court failed to acknowledge the technology-based ambiguity of the word “from,” 
there is not an adequate consideration of how “from” would comport with this 
section of the FMA.  At the very least, it is arguable that this exception would 
actually encompass VidAngel’s practice of ripping and streaming since it uses 
this technology in the process of making portions of movies imperceptible for 
streaming. 
As the Ninth Circuit points out, this creates a possible loophole for piracy 
that simply cannot be ignored.116  It could be minimized, though, by using 
another textual tool: specifically, since this section of the FMA is clearly an 
exception to general copyright rules, under the traditional textualist approach it 
should be construed narrowly. In this way, if the court found that VidAngel was 
entitled to an FMA exception, it’s holding could reasonably be limited to 
businesses utilizing the same type of sophisticated model. That is, the average 
“rip-and-stream” pirate of the internet could not be afforded the FMA 
exemption.  While some may say this reads too far into the statute in search of a 
subjective reading, it is conceivably supported by other non-textualist tools of 
interpretation. 
For one thing, given the ambiguity that arises out of the development of 
technology, it is necessary to also consider the legislative intent and history of 
the Act.  Although the Ninth Circuit does include some history, it is sparse at 
best and mostly self-serving: Senator Hatch desired a narrow construction of the 
FMA.117  Senator Hatch went on to say that any violation of copyrighted work 
or a copy protection scheme in order to advance viewer choice was contrary to 
intent and technological necessity.118   
 
 112 869 F.3d at 852. 
 113 Id. at 863–64. In fact, the court found that the VidAngel was not exempt from 
circumvention liability because they lacked the property authority to circumvent encrypted 
technology and that the district court was within its discretion to find that Disney was likely 
to succeed on its DMCA circumvention claim. Id. 
 114 Id. at 859. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. (citing 151 CONG. REC. S450-01, S501 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2005)). 
 118 Id. at 859–60 (quoting 151 CONG. REC. S501)). 
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While this may appear discouraging to the case for VidAngel’s interpretation 
of the FMA, the court does not elaborate nearly enough on the relevant history.  
In particular, the purpose of the FMA was to allow filtering technology in order 
to allow for family-friendly viewing of movies.119  This clearly conflicts with the 
court’s assertion that the purpose of the FMA itself was for the protection of 
intellectual property rights.120 
While protection of established copyright law is important, the court 
neglected to consider the statements promoting the FMA as a way to prevent the 
hampering of technology and allowing it to flourish.121 
Further, the legislative history did provide some insight as to the type of 
technology Congress wished to allow and disallow, but not to the extent that 
would automatically exclude VidAngel.  As the Ninth Circuit points out, the 
FMA was passed specifically with the ClearPlay and Clean Flicks models in 
mind.122  In spite of the court’s effort to equate the two, Clean Flicks and 
VidAngel follow two distinct business models that are similar only in the respect 
that they both used digital technology to filter films.123 They differ in every other 
material way. 
First, Clean Flicks engaged in mass bootlegging of films, which was explicitly 
addressed in the legislative history.124  The Clean Flicks model is clearly in 
violation of the FMA’s ban on creating fixed copies of the altered movies, but 
the VidAngel model is much less clear.  VidAngel does not create a fixed copy 
of an altered version of a movie and mass-sell it like Clean Flicks does. Instead, 
VidAngel has a fixed number of movies it can use in its buy/sell model of renting 
movies that is determined by the number of physical copies of movies that 
VidAngel actually buys.125 Further, VidAngel does not create a fixed copy.126  
Instead, it allows each user to personalize his or her viewing experience and have 
an altered version of the movie for his or her viewing.127  If the customer follows 
VidAngel’s request to return the movie, the altered version is not retained and is 
 
 119 151 CONG. REC. S495 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 120 See Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 858 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 
Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218)).  The 
purpose of the FMA would fall under the “and for other purposes” language included in the 
Family Entertainment and Copyright Act. 
 121 151 CONG. REC. S499 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Cornyn); 151 CONG. 
REC. H2117, H2119 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 2005) (statement of Rep. Cannon). 
 122 Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 860. 
 123 Id. 
 124 See 150 CONG. REC. S11853 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2004) (comparing an unauthorized use of 
a movie to a bootleg copy of a movie, which would violate the FMA). 
 125 See Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 853–54. 
 126 Id. at 854. 
 127 See id. 
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no longer viewable.128  The only part of VidAngel’s model that could possibly 
qualify as a fixed copy is its master copy of the film.  However, this master copy 
is clearly not the altered, fixed copy to which the legislature was referring to.  The 
legislature was concerned with fixed copies that could be reproduced and sold in 
mass, like Clean Flicks.129  The VidAngel master copy was only used to tag the 
film and allow for customers to watch their own personalized, altered version 
which ceases to exist upon return of the movie to VidAngel.130 
Second, the FMA specifically targeted the Clean Flicks model of adding 
content in order to make certain parts of movies imperceptible.131  Quite clearly, 
VidAngel follows ClearPlay in the method of only fast-forwarding and skipping 
content instead of the Clean Flicks model of inserting new and different content 
into the movies.132  Indeed, the minority view of the House was correctly 
concerned that the FMA would target Clean Flicks and cause it to lose its case.133  
Since it is clear the legislature intended to target Clean Flicks, the comparison 
between VidAngel and Clean Flicks is a useful point of comparison in seeing if 
VidAngel’s model conflicts with the intent of the legislature. However, the court 
failed to engage this comparison aside from the mere conjecture that the two 
models were both in conflict with the legislature’s intentions because they both 
used digital methods to create altered versions of movies. 
As briefly mentioned above, the purpose of the statute can be unveiled 
through the text and history.  It seems clear that the FMA’s purpose was to 
simultaneously allow for family-friendly viewing of movies with not so family-
friendly content, while doing so in a manner that would not completely undercut 
existing copyright law.  Although the Ninth Circuit did not directly address this 
issue, it would be a fair assumption that the court would likely put more emphasis 
on preserving the existing copyright law.  However, it is possible for the VidAngel 
case to fulfill both purposes of the FMA. 
Most obviously, ClearPlay fulfills the purpose of providing family-friendly 
viewing.  There is little to no argument that this is satisfied.  However, with a 
narrow decision in the case, an interpretation of the FMA in favor of VidAngel 
could also preserve established copyright law.  As previously mentioned, a strict 
allowance of the VidAngel model as acceptable under the FMA would prevent a 
surge in online piracy. 
 
 128 Id.  A customer can sell the digital copy back to the company and can no longer view the 
title. Additionally, all copies are digital and therefore not “fixed” in the physical sense of being 
fixed on a disc. 
 129 See 151 CONG. REC. S5494 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 130 See Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 853–54. 
 131 Id. at 860. 
 132 Id. 
 133 H.R. REP. NO. 109-33, pt. 1, at 69–72 (2005). 
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It is clearly the intent of the legislature to disallow any form of mass 
bootlegging of a single altered version.134  Any individual or company that tries 
to engage in this would be in direct violation of the FMA.  Additionally, the 
language does not allow for any fixed copies, so online pirates could not set up 
a mass stream of a film altered in a particular way (or multiple ways) without 
being in violation of the FMA.  Further, it would also be impossible for an 
individual or company to provide for a service similar to VidAngel and only alter 
the credits, since this would be in direct conflict with the purpose of filtering out 
objectionable content and not just extraneous content.135  Thus, by interpreting 
the FMA both in a narrowly and in VidAngel’s favor, the purpose of the FMA 
could be both served and protected. 
Approaching the problem from a pragmatic sense, a narrow interpretation in 
favor of VidAngel is the most sensible.  To begin with, it is generally clear that 
society is positively impacted when technology is allowed to flourish and prosper.  
Additionally, society is shifting to become more dependent on stream-based 
content, so it makes sense to interpret the FMA in step with an eye toward what’s 
best serves society. However, society also benefits when creators retain their 
protection. It is therefore necessary to preserve copyrights and keep creators 
comfortable and protected.  Most importantly, it is necessary to balance these 
two benefits and determine which would benefit society more: having creators’ 
work more accessible or ensuring that copyright laws are not compromised.  
Given our society’s dependence upon intellectual property law to obtain valuable 
innovation, it seems clear that the more important issue of the two is ensuring 
that copyright laws are not compromised.  Therefore, it needs to be determined 
if there is an interpretation that can prevent copyright infringement while also 
allowing greater access to movies and for technological innovation. 
Given the previous discussion on the purpose of the FMA, it should be clear 
that such an interpretation of the FMA readily exists.  By allowing VidAngel to 
continue its business and for future technologies to fit under the FMA, 
technology is allowed to continue its rapid development without being hindered 
through litigation.  Additionally, narrowly construing the FMA in favor of 
VidAngel to only allow comparable models would preserve copyright.  Again, it 
is important to reiterate that this pragmatic take is only in the context of the FMA 
interpretation and does not necessarily include the surrounding claims that were 
present in the Ninth Circuit case.  These other claims could very well shift the 
weight to preserving the remaining copyright laws and sacrificing the 
development of technology in this particular instance. 
 
 134 See 151 CONG. REC. S494 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 135 It should be noted that a loophole in VidAngel’s model allowed for customers to select 
credits to be filtered out along with any other content, even if the movie did not contain such 
content.  This is clearly at odds with the purpose of the FMA and would not stand up in this 
analysis. 
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Finally, a dynamic approach to this issue follows along similar grounds.  It is 
hardly fair to call the FMA, a 2005 statute, “old” in the sense of time.  Even so, 
“old” can be relative.  For example, consider the development of Netflix and 
how rapidly the company grew and changed platforms.  Within a decade, 
Netflix’s primary method of media delivery switched to streaming from mail-
order DVDs.136  Technology, especially that of home-viewing media, is always 
looking for the next big step and is rapidly changing.  While it may seem like a 
stretch to call a 2005 statute old only a little over a decade later, it becomes less 
of a stretch when considered against the rapid advance of technology. 
Indeed, the dynamic approach calls for new interpretations whenever there 
has been a significant societal shift.  In 2005, DVDs and hard copy discs were 
the prominent technology and the face of at-home media.  In today’s culture, it 
is now streaming that is seen as the face of at-home media.  It would certainly 
make sense to adapt the FMA in order to include streaming as a viable option 
for viewing media in a family-friendly way.  It is true that a simple shift in 
technology may be an insufficient reason to most to interpret the FMA in a 
manner that broadens what the Act encompasses. However, when considered 
alongside all of the other issues raised in regard to the FMA, this dynamic 
approach adds even more weight to the argument in favor of interpreting the 
FMA to include VidAngel’s model.   
B.  BACK TO THE FUTURE: HOW COURTS SHOULD APPROACH THESE STATUTES 
MOVING FORWARD 
The Disney Enterprises case will certainly not be the last time a court is faced 
with the dilemma of interpreting a statute in the face of rapidly advancing 
technology.  Due to this fact, a balance must be determined that allows for the 
advancement of technology but still gives respect to Congressional decisions in 
statutes.  Using the suggestion proposed by this note on how to approach the 
FMA, such a balance can be accomplished. 
First and foremost, courts should continue the longstanding tradition of 
adhering to the text of a statute.  Even if a purely textual reading will 
unquestionably limit technology, unambiguous statutory language should not be 
thrown to the side by a court.  Courts should, however, consider more carefully 
whether language is ambiguous.  As is evident in Disney Enterprises, even relatively 
unambiguous words (like “from”) can have ambiguous meanings with changes 
in technology.  Courts should consider how the language comports with the 
technology in question, assuming there is no language in the statute that expressly 
limits the statutes reach to a particular technology. 
Of course, the most natural response is to say that the duty is with Congress 
to change the language or pass a new statute that encompasses the new 
 
 136 Netflix Timeline, supra note 3. 
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technology.  However, the “sit back and wait” approach is inefficient and 
detrimental to advancing technology.  Given the rapid rate at which technology 
changes, and the inefficient rate at which a majority of legislation is passed, it is 
obvious that pure reliance on Congress would result in nothing short of 
inhibiting growth and development in certain areas of technology. Particularly in 
situations like this, where technological developments at least arguably render 
statutory language ambiguous, courts should be wary of letting life outdistance 
law by insisting that “textualism” be synonymous with “literalism.”   
Admittedly it is also important for the courts not to diminish the power of 
Congress.  This can be prevented by placing Congress on notice that statutory 
language is more likely to be considered ambiguous where it affects rapidly 
advancing technology.  With this notice, Congress can be more conscious of how 
broad they want the statute to extend in the future and, if they so choose, include 
language that indicates a statute should only be interpreted to affect particular 
technology.  This would force Congress to consider future implications of 
statutes and encourage more conscientious and thoughtful legislation, instead of 
adhering to a methodology in which there is constant uncertainty of new 
technology’s place in older statues. 
a statute’s language is ambiguous regarding new technology, the court should 
be willing to consider the legislative intent and history.  While not as powerful as 
unambiguous language, legislative intent is important to also ensure that 
Congress is not deprived of its power. Particular language might be ambiguous, 
but there may still be a clear intent of Congress regarding a statute.  In the 
particular context of a statute directly implicating advancing technology, it would 
be important for a court to consider any acknowledgement that the statute was 
or was not meant to affect future technology. 
As an example, consider the legislative history of the FMA.  There was a clear 
intention, stated numerous times in the presence of advocates and opponents of 
the FMA, that the FMA was intended to prevent the inhibition of developing 
technology.137  Throughout the different hearings and reports, the intent of 
allowing the development of technology was never questioned.  In fact, one of 
the major issues brought up by the minority was the fact that the FMA was only 
favoring a specific technology.138 
Granted, it is not always possible to determine a collective intent of Congress. 
In the case of the FMA, it was never fully deliberated and discussed how it should 
apply to future technologies.  There was also some legislative history that cut 
against VidAngel’s technology.139  Since it is often difficult to pinpoint a singular 
 
 137 See supra text accompanying notes 119–121. 
 138 H.R. REP. NO. 109-33, at 69 (2005). 
 139 See, e.g., Disney Enters. Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 859–60 (2017) (discussing 
statements of Sen. Hatch). 
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intent, the legislative history will not typically control interpretation statutes 
implicating advancing technology.  However, this does not mean that the history 
cannot give considerable weight to one interpretation or the other. 
After analyzing the language and history of the statute, the court will likely 
have an idea of what the purpose of the statute is.  While this part of the statutory 
analysis may begin to invite more subjectivity, but it still is primarily based on an 
objective analysis. The analysis largely becomes a balancing of any conflicting 
purposes, and an inquiry into whether there is any version of the interpretation 
that allows for simultaneous fulfillment of the purposes.  The court should first 
focus on preserving the primary purposes of the statute and then engage in an 
analysis of how to include any secondary purposes without violating the primary 
purposes. 
Even if there is an interpretation that allows for the advancement of 
technology, a court should consider pragmatic implications.  Given the general 
benefit of technology, pragmatism will typically weigh in favor of interpreting a 
statute to include advancing technology.  However, there may be instances where 
the technology could jeopardize current statutes and may actually be 
counterproductive to society.  While this is mostly a subjective decision to be 
made by courts, which is typically not common, it is an important distinction to 
be considered. 
If the only construction of the statute available would cause substantial 
detriment, then a more constricting interpretation may be necessary.  Consider 
the difference between an online mass piracy website and VidAngel.  A narrow 
interpretation of the FMA for VidAngel benefits society and limits detriment 
done to surrounding copyright law.140  However, an interpretation that permits 
mass bootleg downloading and viewing would undoubtedly be detrimental to 
both society and the current copyright law. 
Finally, considering the statute from a dynamic standpoint can tilt the scales 
towards one interpretation or another.  However, the dynamic aspect is also the 
most subjective, and therefore questionable, in nature.  A court would first need 
to consider whether the statute is “old” compared to the technology being dealt 
with.  While some technology rapidly changes over the course of a short span of 
years, other types of technology develop at a significantly slower pace. 
As discussed in the above analysis of the Ninth Circuit interpretation, 
technology used for viewing media has substantially changed since 2005 when 
the FMA was enacted.  In that particular instance, it is desirable to interpret the 
statute in a way to keep it relevant as opposed to forcing Congress to try and 
pass legislation at an impossibly fast rate to keep up with technology.  Yet, this 
 
 140 It is important to again note that an interpretation of the FMA in favor of VidAngel 
would not necessarily indicate they should have won their appeal to the Ninth Circuit.  There 
were other claims raised that influenced the decision to uphold the injunction against 
VidAngel.  See generally Disney Enters., 869 F.3d 848. 
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is not the case for every area of technology.  In some instances, technology may 
have developed slowly so that existing legislation gradually became less and less 
applicable. 
While a pure dynamic approach would likely still be in favor of construing a 
statute to fit the new technology, the burden should be on Congress to adopt 
new legislation.  Congress still holds the power to legislate in the situation of 
slowly developing technology, there would be ample time for Congress to 
address and pass legislation to encompass the new technology.  The only time 
when the court should step in and interpret a statute in a manner which 
encompasses new technology is when the development of the technology is so 
rapid that it would be significantly hindered if it has to wait for Congress to pass 
new legislation. 
C.  DEEP IMPACT: HOW VIDANGEL’S NEW SYSTEM SHOULD FIT UNDER THIS 
APPROACH 
Since VidAngel has changed its business model, there is a new question as to 
whether its method of streaming fits within the FMA.  While the previous model 
may have raised some questions as to its legality and was a closer call under the 
FMA, the new subscription model almost certainly fits under the proposed 
construction of the FMA. 
First, VidAngel’s new method eliminates the uncertainty of the “from an 
authorized copy” language.  The above analysis of how the Ninth Circuit should 
have interpreted “from” still stands relevant, but this new technology also takes 
care of the concern over VidAngel’s ripping movies from discs.  While it is not 
yet abundantly clear what the exact process is, VidAngel asserts that they no 
longer rip and decrypt content in order to filter, instead relying on crowd tagging 
and algorithms to provide filters from movies.141  Moving to the exception in the 
FMA for technology that allows for the making imperceptible of media, it seems 
much more likely that VidAngel will prevail with their new technology now that 
the technology is not directly wrapped up in a DMCA claim.  Additionally, this 
fixes the loophole concern of the Ninth Circuit for online piracy. 
Because of the sophistication and subscription-based nature of the new 
VidAngel model, the rule of narrow exception could easily be applied to these 
circumstances and allow for models similar to VidAngel’s to be granted 
exception from copyright claims under the FMA.  Finally, VidAngel’s process is 
patented with additional patents pending,142 so it is not the type of technology 
 
 141 Facts Concerning VidAngel’s New Filtering Technology, VIDANGEL, http://blog.vidangel.com 
/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Fact-Sheet-VidAngels-New-Technology.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2017). 
 142 Id. 
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available to the average internet pirate for use of bootlegging and illegal 
streaming. 
With regard to the legislative history of the FMA, the new business model of 
VidAngel fits more appropriately than the older business model did.  The 
primary purpose of the FMA to allow for family-friendly viewing of movies is 
satisfied because there is no alternative use or need for consumers to subscribe 
to VidAngel.143 
The new model fulfills this purpose by requiring consumers to purchase a 
subscription to VidAngel on top of their subscription to another streaming 
service.144  Consumers can then watch filtered versions of the movies and shows 
they would normally have access to.145  While the old VidAngel model did attract 
consumers wanting to watch a movie at a cheaper cost than other providers while 
filtering little to no content, the new model eliminates any consumers looking to 
abuse the system.  Consumers will only use VidAngel’s services in order to filter 
movies with objectionable content, not to gain cheap access to movies they 
wouldn’t otherwise have access to. 
Further, this new model is the epitome of the advancing technology which 
the FMA was intended to encourage.  This new model is much more in-tune 
with the ClearPlay model that the FMA directly allowed; both models are set up 
in such a way that they will only be used by consumers trying to avoid 
objectionable content in films, and both models require the consumer to have 
some manner of prior access to the media before the filtering technology can be 
used. 
Additionally, there is still not a fixed copy created since each consumer 
customizes their filtering which is not available after the consumer finishes 
watching their movie or show.  Even though VidAngel was distinctly different 
than Clean Flicks prior to the change in business model, there was still some 
uncertainty as to how closely it fit with the intended allowance of the FMA.  Now 
that VidAngel has changed its model and significantly resembles ClearPlay, it is 
much clearer now that the FMA was intended to encompass these types of 
business models. 
Although the previous analysis of the FMA’s purpose still largely stands with 
the new VidAngel model, the new model, unsurprisingly, better fits that purpose. 
The biggest concern with the previous VidAngel model was its potential to 
undercut the FMA’s purpose of preserving existing copyright laws.146  While a 
very narrow exception for VidAngel’s old model could have preserved this 
purpose, a more general exception under the FMA for the new model would also 
suffice.  Instead of carving out a very specific exception for VidAngel’s old 
 
 143 151 CONG. REC. S450-01, S495 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 144 Facts Concerning VidAngel’s New Filtering Technology, supra note 141. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 858–59 (2017). 
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model, the new model can easily be an updated version of the ClearPlay model 
that has already been accepted as appropriate.  This allows the court to look less 
like it is passing legislation, and more like it is adhering to precedent and 
Congress’s decision to allow ClearPlay. 
The pragmatic analysis is also swayed more in favor of VidAngel with this 
new business model. First, the existing body of copyright law is not undercut as 
it may have possibly been under the old model.  The new model also serves 
established streaming services by bringing in new consumers who would not 
otherwise have subscribed to them.147  Since the new VidAngel model requires 
an existing subscription to other streaming services, it gives consumers who want 
to avoid objectionable content a viable reason to subscribe to these services in 
order to view filtered versions of movies and shows.  Simultaneously, this allows 
for exposure to audiences who would likely not get the exposure to the film in 
another way.  This can bolster a creator’s reputation and result in other benefits 
that come along with creators getting higher viewership. 
All of these factors combine to encourage a dynamic interpretation of the 
FMA.  As stated above, total consideration of these factors is critical before a 
court decides to dynamically interpret a statute.  Considering the analysis of why 
the FMA can be considered old when compared to the advancement of 
technology used for viewing media, it is clear that the FMA should be interpreted 
to include VidAngel’s new service. 
While the FMA could have possibly been construed to encompass the old 
VidAngel model, there were still significant questions and uncertainties 
surrounding the method of interpretation for the FMA necessary to reach that 
result.  This new VidAngel model serves as a suitable example of how the 
proposed method of interpretation can soundly be applied to statutes that deal 
with rapidly advancing technology.  While the provided analysis is somewhat 
generalized, and perhaps not as thorough as might, or should, be performed by 
a court of law, it should be clear that there is certainly a viable method for 
including new technology in statutes in order to prevent the hampering of 
technological advancement. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Trying to interpret existing statutes and figuring out how they deal with new 
technology is certainly not a new issue.  It is also an issue that is not going to 
disappear any time soon.  In order to deal with this issue in the future, it is 
imperative for there to be an established method for dealing with these types of 
statutes.  As appealing as it would be to be able to construe all statutes to 
encompass new technology, it is just not a feasible goal. Instead, Congress should 
 
 147 Facts Concerning VidAngel’s New Filtering Technology, supra note 141. 
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have the primary duty of adapting the law over time by passing new statutes to 
encompass technology over time. 
However, there are exceptions to every rule.  There are some types of 
technology that develop and change so rapidly that Congress cannot possibly 
enact statutes quickly enough to keep up with their development.  In these cases, 
it is important that courts be willing to use their interpretive power to prevent 
the inhibition of technological development.  To avoid this process from 
becoming overly arbitrary, courts should rebuttably presume that they must 
interpret statutes to account for the rapid advance of technology. 
Once the court has decided to consider how the statute applies to developing 
technology, the court should engage in interpretation using the traditional tools.  
As with all statutory interpretation, there must be an established basis for the 
court’s interpretation.  First, the court should establish if there is any ambiguity 
in the statute.  During this stage of the analysis, it is important for the court to 
consider how the changes in technology may have caused ambiguity in words 
that would otherwise not appear to be ambiguous.  However, should the court 
find the terms unambiguous in the face of the new technology, then the analysis 
should stop then and there. 
Next, the court should consider how the legislative history and intent fit with 
the advancing technology.  Primarily, the court should seek out any history or 
intent of Congress that suggests that the statute was meant or not meant to apply 
to future technology.  Further, the court should determine what type of 
technology was considered in the legislative history and how the new technology 
matches up. 
Once the court has considered both the history and text of the statute, the 
purpose should become more evident.  Once a purpose has been established, the 
court should consider possible interpretations, such as very narrow inclusions or 
exceptions that can fulfill all the purposes.  If such an interpretation does not 
exist, then the court should use the text and history to determine what the 
primary purpose was and use an interpretation consistent with the primary 
purpose.  Often, this interpretation will be such that it is meant to preserve the 
existing body of law surrounding the technology. 
Following the purpose, the court should consider the pragmatic implications 
of the possible interpretations.  While the development of technology is typically 
in the best interest of society, this is not always the case.  The court should 
consider all the potential implications and potential detriments to society from a 
dynamic interpretation of the statue, such as loopholes, undercutting existing 
laws, and hurting economic markets. 
Once all these different tools have been considered and evaluated, the court 
should do a final balancing of them all to determine if the statute warrants 
dynamic interpretation.  As indicated in the above analysis, this analysis will not 
always result in an interpretation in favor of technology.  For the older VidAngel 
model, this interpretation could swing either way.  There are a number of 
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uncertainties and ambiguities that would have to be thoroughly fleshed out, and 
the detriment could outweigh the benefit.  While a very narrow inclusion of the 
old model could fit under the FMA, it hinges on the borderline of judicial 
lawmaking.  However, the new VidAngel model presents a clear example of 
when a statute can be interpreted to include new technology with minimal 
detriment. 
There will never be a bright line rule that provides a clear indication of when 
and when not to interpret statutes to include new technology.  This process of 
interpretation will demand courts to use their sound judgment as to the different 
factors, assuming there is at least some manner of textual ambiguity.  While it is 
perhaps not the most desirable method to include this type of discretion in the 
court, it is essential to the furtherance of society and technology.  Judges will 
often not be experts on the nuances of technology, but they are experts in the 
craft of evaluating various factors and the implications on society.  For this 
reason, this approach to statutory interpretation should be adopted and used in 
courts when issues come up regarding rapidly developing technology. 
 
28
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol25/iss2/7
